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1. Introduction
Some artists begin with careful plans, sketches, preliminary draw-
ings and even paintings before settling on one particular direction.
Claude Monet, for example, carefully planned and prepared his work to
coincide with specific natural light, timing his activity according to
when and how daylight touched his canvas (House, 2004). His work
was revolutionary: masterpieces such as his famous Impressions, Sunrise
and subsequent Water Lilies series were intended to capture the feelings
initiated by observation and interpretation; they exceeded the mere
recording of scenery details. Other artists seemed to obtain their in-
spiration internally, beginning with little formal preparation. They
approached the canvas experientially. Jackson Pollock adopted this
style with his famous drip paintings - action pieces that were acclaimed
to show motion, depicting accidents and energy.
Like artists, organizations striving for innovation seek to find unique
combinations of resources with the goal of creating something new – be
it new products, services, business models, or any combination thereof.
Importantly, though, organizations are multi-agent systems, with dif-
fering individual goals and with each agent's effort contributing to-
wards the overall purpose (Weick, 1974). Yet, organizing is a process
that is starkly different to (and should not be mistaken for) organiza-
tions themselves and is thought to differ widely depending on context
and across temporal dimensions.
Early work on organizing was inextricably linked to economic
production of material goods. Currently, and corresponding to our
dominant current driver of value creation today, a growing perspective
on organization looks into information technology (IT) and its role for
organizing, but also how actors in the IT industry are organizing
(Puranam, Alexy, & Reitzig, 2014).
“If you went to bed last night as an industrial company, you're going
to wake up this morning as a software and analytics company.” This is
how Jeff Immelt, Chairman and CEO of General Electric (GE), sum-
marized the disruptive changes triggered by the digital transformation
that hit virtually all companies. GE responded by creating GE Digital
and redefining itself as a “digital industrial company” with a focus on
digitally enabled products (Rigby, Sutherland, & Takeuchi, 2016). In
today's digital age, product development at GE and many other com-
panies around the globe increasingly involves - and indeed resembles -
software development. Over the last decades, the process of software
development has been shaped by the adoption of so-called agile de-
velopment methods such as scrum, extreme programming, or lean de-
velopment (Cram & Newell, 2016). These agile approaches take the
inherent unpredictability of software development into account and
advocate highly iterative, time-boxed development cycles owned by
self-organizing cross-functional teams that actively solicit and in-
corporate customer feedback at each iteration to improve the working
software as the dominant measure of progress (Beck et al., 2001).
It is against this backdrop that this Special Issue (SI) on “Innovation
in the Digital Age: From Stage-Gate to an Agile Development
Paradigm?” explores whether traditional product development models
such as Stage-Gate (Cooper, 1986, 2008) are still fit for purpose in to-
day's digital age or whether they are set to be widely replaced by agile
approaches even in more traditional contexts. The basic idea of con-
ventional models to organize innovation is that they see innovation as a
deterministic process that can be planned ex-ante and then be executed
and controlled. The idea is to de-risk the innovation process by in-
cluding a number of go-or-kill decision gates, where projects are vetted
against predefined performance indicators. In contrast, agile ap-
proaches are stochastic. They follow the understanding of an iterative
planning cycle where the outcomes of one short phase of execution
inform the design of the following stage, and so on. Uncertainty is
discovered and addressed continuously during the execution process.
Stage-gate aims at controlling uncertainty upfront, thus avoiding sub-
sequent changes, whereas agile development focuses on adaptation and
the accommodation of change throughout the development processes.
Table 1 provides a stylized comparison of the two development models
at the center of this Special Issue.
This Special Issue presents six research papers that address the
promises, perils and boundary conditions associated with agile product
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development in comparison to conventional development processes.
We proceed as follows: We first summarize the main findings of the
articles included in this Special Issue and then try to synthesize the
trade-offs in organizing innovation that each study is addressing.
Subsequently, we discuss the Special Issue articles and their respective
contribution vis-à-vis new paradigms of organizing innovation.
Additionally, we present the case of the e-mobility venture
StreetScooter to illustrate how agile development processes can be
applied in the traditional context of automotive development. We end
by discussing managerial implications and summarizing central
boundary conditions of agile and stage-gate innovation approaches. We
hope this will support managers in their efforts of organizing innova-
tion activities in a way that is carefully tailored to the idiosyncrasies of
their respective organization.
2. Research synthesis
Article #1: Exploring innovative ideas marks the beginning of many
organizational journeys. Yet, how can those be identified? What makes
a good idea and how can they be turned into products? Dziallas (2019)
studies front-end evaluation approaches and indicators for new product
development. For incremental innovations in the automotive industry,
the author identifies four central indicators, (1) high customer re-
levance, (2) strategic fit, (3) high communication potential, and (4)
vision potential that foster more agile and faster front-end decision-
making. Hence, even in innovation environments that appear incre-
mental in nature, organizations can not only solve repetitive customer
requirements (what we might refer to as exploitation), but also might
be able to solve unique challenges (what we might refer to as ex-
ploration) when front-end innovation can be strengthened. Front-end
innovation indicators may lead to more transparent, traceable, and
reliable innovation decisions. To ensure success, however, information
generation should be routinized to allow for organizational learning.
Article #2: Ghezzi and Cavallo (2019) study business model in-
novation in multisided platform startups that operate in structurally
heterogeneous environments. Their analysis varies the context in which
the start-ups find themselves. They specifically focus on how firms can
execute temporary organizational tasks, such as defining markets, de-
veloping business models, or managing human resources. They high-
light that lean start-up methods can be applied successfully to innova-
tion organizing when there are continuous changes in customers'
requirements and product value proposition. When environmental dy-
namism is moderate, the firm should emphasize value-capturing
activities to keep the costs of experimenting down. When environ-
mental dynamism is high, however, firms should focus on value de-
livery and value creation activities, such as user onboarding and cus-
tomer relationship management.
Article #3: Bianchi, Marzi, and Guerini (2019) study the inter-re-
lation between agile and stage-gate driven innovation processes. The
authors find that managing software development following stage-gate
principles is detrimental to performance; it leads to time and cost
overruns. Hence, when requirements are unknown and far from stable,
early planning and commitment will not work properly. Yet, their work
also reports that not all principles that are generally subsumed under
agile methods will live up to expectations. Importantly, only sprints
result in speed, cost and quality advantages. This might in turn, be
related to the underlying innovation logic. When products to be de-
veloped are more incremental in nature, iterative, yet time-boxed cycles
(hybrid agile stage-gate) processes may provide the best of both worlds.
However, when the underlying product is more radical in nature, pure
agile methods work better.
Overall, the first three articles in this Special Issue seek to identify
critical boundary conditions that shape the comparative advantage of
stage-gate and agile approaches to organizing innovation activities. As
such, Dziallas (2019) identifies four key indicators related to the spe-
cific innovation context that are conductive to agile front-end innova-
tion processes in the traditional automotive sector. Ghezzi and Cavallo
(2019) then emphasize that agile methods work best in environments
characterized by high dynamism. Bianchi et al. (2019) delineate and
contextualize these findings further. They report that agile methods
work best if task uncertainty und the degree of innovation involved is
high, but that with moderate levels of task uncertainty and degrees of
innovation firms would fare better with agile stage-gate approaches.
Broadly speaking, the decision between agile and stage-gate appears
to resemble a trade-off that organizations face on the broader institu-
tional level: the trade-off between efficiency and flexibility. Incremental
innovation can be dissected and managed in discrete stages in an effort
to enhance efficiency. However, this would be ill-suited for more ra-
dical innovation and fast-paced environments. Similarly, when task
requirements are complex, unique, and frequently changing, the flex-
ibility promised by agile approaches moves into the foreground.
The second set of three articles in this Special Issue therefore ex-
tends this contingency perspective by shedding light on the temporal
dimension of organizing innovation. These articles propose that orga-
nizations do not simply adjudicate between agile and stage-based in-
novation paradigms as a function of innovation context, customer
Table 1
Comparison of stage-gate gate and agile development (expanded from Cooper, 2016, p.2).
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requirements and task complexity. Instead, they highlight the im-
portance of time as an additional boundary condition with special
emphasis on organizational learning and temporary forms of orga-
nizing.
Article #4: In this spirit, Annosi, Martini, Brunetta, and
Marchegiani (2019) study an environment that connects an agile and
stage-gate based model. Rather than focusing on trade-offs between
either an agile or a stage-gate paradigm, they investigate how routine
individual action and adaptation can be managed. Underneath a more
dynamic view of change lies the notion of organizational learning.
Annosi et al. (2019) therefore study self-managed, team-based organi-
zations, and document how team members learn from projects, and
show how they make sense of team-based experiences. Importantly,
learning is not universal. To ensure that learning takes place, an agile
environment needs management intervention to improve individual
competence-based learning. The study highlights the different trajec-
tories necessary to move from the process of organizing innovation
(with a finite focus) to making the transition to an innovation organi-
zation (with an indefinite focus). Learning needs to be woven into the
fabric of the organizational structure. When tasks are temporary and
the organizing unit's life is finite, knowledge may disperse when the
team achieved their purpose and the organizing team dissolves (Bakker,
2010; Sydow, Lindkvist, & DeFillippi, 2004).
Article #5: Fecher, Winding, Hutter, and Füller (2019) analyze a
similarly dynamic environment and show how knowledge that is in-
dividually generated needs to be integrated subsequently. By focusing
on innovation labs in the banking industry, they show the promises and
perils that agile knowledge generation has and how it can be re-in-
tegrated to lead not only to individual learning, but also to organiza-
tional learning. Meyerson et al. (1996: p. 168) define temporary sys-
tems as consisting of teams of people ‘who have never worked together
before and who do not expect to work together again”. Once the team
dissolves, the knowledge dissipates. If knowledge should proliferate
within the organization, it requires a thoughtful process that manages
participants’ expectations, team building, and can ensure knowledge re-
integration. Corporations not only set-up new organizational entities
with the sole purpose of being innovative, bringing the product to
market, and to dissolve subsequently but also to re-integrate these
teams and the learning into the organization subsequently. Managing
agile teams over time and within an organization with an infinite time
horizon therefore requires both carefully designed routines and strong
leadership.
Article #6: Mills, Berthon, and Pitt (2019) study whether agile
models can be of use beyond the more complex high-tech industries and
whether stage-gate driven models could also be applied for informa-
tion-based products. The authors employ the concept of innovation
authorship, a product owner involved in an idea-to-launch process,
where knowledge is person-specific rather than routine-based. The idea
of authorship as exemplified by James Patterson's collaborative writing
and coproduction is similar to the thousands of micro-entrepreneurs
embedded in electronic and household appliance manufacturer Haier's
organizational structure. With strong leadership and vision alongside a
very pronounced individual employee's entrepreneurial drive do hyper-
agile organizations flourish.
3. Towards an innovation organization
The articles in this Special Issue shed light on the critical interplay
between task requirements, innovation objective and ambition, and
time horizon in shaping the relative advantage of distinct modes of
organizing innovation. This emerging pattern is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Classic stage-gate models appear to best suited for incremental in-
novation in seemingly predictable contexts in which customer and task
requirements are well understood (Bianchi et al., 2019).
Temporary organizational forms (special innovation vehicles), in
contrast, might be the solution of choice when striving for radical
innovation in relatively well-understood contexts with repetitive task
requirements, provided the knowledge will be re-integrated into the
focal organization (Fecher et al., 2019).
Agile-stage-gate hybrids, in turn, are a particularly attractive form of
organizing incremental innovation initiatives in the presence of task
uncertainty (Ghezzi & Cavallo, 2019).
Agile models in their pure form, finally, move center stage for radical
initiatives in dynamic contexts with unique and yet to be discovered
task requirements.
Yet, how can firms develop dynamic capabilities to be routinely
innovative regardless of innovations being radical or incremental or
task requirements being unique or repetitive? In the following, we
synthesize a potential trajectory as to how organizations can embed
stage-gate routines or agile development processes into the heart of an
innovation organization whose innovation management process is un-
folding dynamically.
Hopp and Greene (2018) remind us about the simple but vital fact
that temporal dimensions are an important driver of when and how
organizational processes are effective or ineffective. The ancient Greeks
used two expressions to denote time: chronos and kairos. Chronos is the
objective, linear, and mechanical absolute time. Kairos is qualitative
and permanent in nature and describes an opportune and critical mo-
ment. The former refers to chronological or sequential time, while the
latter signifies a proper or opportune time for action. For organizations,
it is paramount to understand when to transition from one paradigm to
the other (Ansari, Reinecke, & Spaan, 2014).
To advance our understanding of how firms can transition from
organizing for innovation to an innovation organization, we need to
account for the institutionalization of organizational learning. Crossan,
Cunha, Vera, and Cunha (2005) found “that a lack of temporal fit be-
tween the individual and organization will impede, or completely
block, the alignment between the organizational and environmental
rhythms” (p. 142). Importantly, organizations need to find a way to
memorize learnings from agile teams to make them widely accessible
throughout the organization. Knowledge needs to be codified where
possible to ensure a certain level of economies from repetition and to
develop capabilities that can be accessed again at a later point in time.
While temporary organizations can manage and solve problems, it is
paramount that learnings can be institutionalized (Bakker, 2010; Sydow
et al., 2004).
While agile software development places an emphasis on early and
close customer feedback during the product development process, there
is very little room for learning from customer experience after software
delivery and deployment. The concept of continuous deployment focuses
Fig. 1. Organizing task and innovation trade-offs in infinite time.
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on the ability to not only deliver software but also to continuously learn
(in real-time) from customer usage. Continuous deployment therefore
enables companies to shorten feedback loops substantially. Similarly,
this may also allow eliminating features that do not produce any cus-
tomer value (Olsson, Alahyari, & Bosch, 2012). Continuous deployment
then follows several inter-related steps. Software updates are kept to a
minimum and reasonably small; deployment follows development im-
mediately (after appropriate testing); the decision to deploy is at the
developer's discretion; and the deployment is fully automated (Savor
et al., 2016). Continuous deployment is now being used by the likes of
Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Netflix.
Continuous deployment provides several benefits over other ex-
isting software development methods ranging from enhanced pro-
ductivity to increased developer motivation, decreased software risks
and higher software quality. However, the use of continuous deploy-
ment may naturally come at the expense of a lack of control and pre-
dictability in software life cycles (Savor et al., 2016). Hence, it is dy-
namic but clearly not for all and sundry.
At the company level, the Chinese appliance company Haier has
taken their organizational structure to new extremes. CEO Zhang
Ruimin describes his vision as follows: “We encourage employees to
become entrepreneurs because people are not a means to an end, but an
end in themselves. Our goal is to let everyone become their own CEO
[…] to help everyone fully realize their potential.” This hyper-agility in
organizational structure has led to thousands of micro-enterprises run
by small teams under the Haier umbrella (Hamel & Zanini, 2016). Haier
represents an organization capable of continuous transformation; one
that is able to maintain a co-creation ecosystem. The overall strategic
vision delegates decision-making power very deep into the organiza-
tion. Senior management occupies a strategic position, yet with very
limited operational influence. “Haier doesn't authorize employees to do
their work. Instead we provide a platform for them. We are committed
to providing the platform in which there are different kinds of busi-
nesses.” (Leavy, 2016:33).
The notion of hyper-agility as evidenced in the case of Haier is
consistent with Aggarwal, Posen, and Workiewicz (2017) who show
that an exploration policy in the formative period of developing rou-
tines for organizations can influence a firm's capacity to adapt to
change in maturity. Hence, agile firms can exhibit properties of rou-
tines: efficacy and organizational memory. Organizations that ‘entrain’
(“the process by which activity cycles of one system synchronize to
those of another, more dominant system” (Khavul, Pérez-Nordtvedt, &
Wood, 2010: 106)) their innovation activities with a dominant firm, a
disruptive technology, a client requirement are more likely to fit with
their external environment and thereby achieve better organizational
outcomes (Ancona & Chong, 1996).
4. Practical implications
Agile innovation approaches are far from being only theoretical
considerations, as the articles in this Special Issue show. The focus of
agile development on rapid execution, customer validation, and itera-
tive refinement appears valuable. It is particularly important when
customers exhibit changing preferences and high willingness to colla-
borate, when problems are complex but can be broken down into dis-
tinct modules for successive iterations, and when interim mistakes
constitute valuable learning opportunities rather than major risks to be
avoided at all cost (Rigby et al., 2016). Yet, the question obviously
remains as to whether or not agile organizing is the panacea to all or-
ganizational trade-offs companies face. In fact, granularity of develop-
ment tasks and rapid iterations are much easier for purely digital pro-
ducts like software than in the case of complex, mechatronic products.
The tragic death of a Tesla driver using a beta version of the firm's
“autopilot” function illustrates the inherent risks and ethical challenges
associated with using agile approaches in more conventional contexts
with high safety requirements. This highlights the need to better
understand if companies can really develop complex physical products
like gas turbines or medical devices at Internet pace and in constant,
agile iterations. The following case study of StreetScooter nicely illus-
trates the use of – and preconditions for – agile development in a tra-
ditionally hardware-centric industry.
5. An agile StreetScooter1 story - think big, start small
The StreetScooter, an electric delivery vehicle produced by the
company of the same name (www.streetscooter.eu), is an example of
how agile innovation can be accomplished, even in traditional, en-
trenched industries and despite the vast presence of established global
players. Interestingly, the StreetScooter started as a research project at
RWTH Aachen University where two professors – Günther Schuh and
Achim Kampker – aimed to explore whether it was possible to develop
and produce an affordable electric vehicle in a high-wage country such
as Germany. In 2010, the research team joined forces with over 80
industry partners and several university institutes and started devel-
oping the StreetScooter, an affordable and cost-effective electric car for
short journeys.
In 2011, only a year later, the team presented the first version of the
StreetScooter – then called A12 – at the International Motor Show in
Frankfurt, the world's largest motor show. The media coverage fol-
lowing the presentation in Frankfurt eventually caught the attention of
Deutsche Post DHL, the world's largest logistics company. At the time,
Deutsche Post DHL faced a large organizational challenge: While e-
commerce and, thus, the demand for fast and reliable deliveries in
urban areas were continuously growing, cities across the world were
struggling with increasing pollution and CO2 emissions. In other words,
Deutsche Post DHL was in a need for mobility solutions that were cost-
efficient and environmentally friendly. To solve this challenge, the
company had reached out repeatedly to the major players in the
German car industry, but was turned down every single time. Owing to
these negative experiences, Deutsche Post DHL decided to partner with
StreetScooter and awarded a development contract to the young com-
pany.
The partnership quickly proved to be a successful one. In 2012, the
StreetScooter team presented the “Work” utility vehicle, a fleet vehicle
specially tailored for the everyday work of postal delivery. In 2014,
Deutsche Post DHL acquired StreetScooter, putting itself in a position to
produce its own delivery vehicles. As of 2018, more than 8000
StreetScooter vehicles are in daily use on the road. Gradually, Deutsche
Post DHL is looking to replace up to 30,000 vehicles with the
StreetScooter and has also started offering the StreetScooter concept to
third-party firms and public organizations that are also in need of
electric mobility solutions for urban environments.
While the StreetScooter case is undoubtedly a noteworthy example
of entrepreneurial vision and audacity, the more interesting question is:
How is it that a small spin-off from a German university was able to
compete against well-funded, technologically sophisticated car com-
panies and come up with a mobility solution that these companies were
either unwilling or unable to provide? In their book “Think Big, Start
Small”, the founders of StreetScooter reflect extensively on the devel-
opment principles that allowed the company to come up with an
electric vehicle in a very short amount of time and at a fraction of the
typical development costs. These principles are typical of agile ap-
proaches and include 1) relying on rapid prototyping, 2) integrating
customers continuously in the development, 3) managing risk at an
early stage of the development process, and 4) building an en-
trepreneurial culture that seeks to learn from mistakes. These principles
are briefly elaborated below.
First, the research team at StreetScooter emphasized the importance
1 Unless otherwise indicated, information on the Streetscooter are based on
the book: “Think big, start small: Streetscooter the e-mobility success story.”
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of building and testing prototypes in early phases of the development
process, an idea that is also propagated by Design Thinking approaches.
As such, the team set out to learn as early as possible, which, in turn,
required physical, tangible prototypes that could be handled, experi-
enced, and evaluated. Unlike the prototypes that are constructed in
traditional, stage-gate development approaches and that are typically
stripped-down versions of a test model, the prototypes at StreetScooter
were built quickly from materials such as cardboard, wood, and alu-
minum. In particular, the emphasis on early prototypes, called primo-
types at StreetScooter, served three different purposes in the develop-
ment process. From a knowledge perspective, building primotypes
allowed the team to swiftly test many different hypotheses and to move
gradually to the most effective solution. From a functional perspective,
the developers did not set out to build a prototype for the entire car but
different prototypes for different functional problems. For instance, to
test the ergonomic properties of the interior, the team built a specific
prototype from wood and cardboard, a testing procedure that was quick
and inexpensive but sufficient for solving this particular kind of pro-
blem. From a communication perspective, the prototypes acted as
translation and communication platforms – known as boundary objects
(Carlile, 2002) –, allowing everybody involved in the process to develop
a shared idea of the car.
Second, another key feature of the development process consisted
in integrating customers right from the very start. In doing so, the re-
search team aimed to ensure that the StreetScooter would effectively
address the customers' specific needs, that is, the needs of postal
couriers working their daily delivery routes. To this end, over 150
couriers were invited to participate in workshops and encouraged to
voice their specific needs, leading to numerous changes to the vehicle.
For instance, the development team learnt that the passenger seat was
rarely, if ever, used in conventional delivery vehicles. Hence, they
decided to do without a passenger seat in the StreetScooter and to use
the space next to the driver's seat for installing additional trays for
storing packages. While such changes may seem minor at first sight,
collectively they resulted in a vehicle that allowed couriers to complete
their daily routines more effectively.
Importantly, however, this emphasis on customer needs was com-
bined with a strict prioritization of requirements. That is, all customer
requirements were intensively discussed to understand which ones
were crucial requirements that would necessitate customized solutions
and which ones were basic requirements that could be satisfied with
standard solutions. For example, the team discovered that the quality of
some of the copper wire used in the car could be reduced by a factor of
10 without sacrificing quality in the final product. The advantages of
this two-pronged approach to customer integration are easy to discern:
On the one hand, the approach leads to a product that is aligned with
customers' specific needs; on the other hand, it ensures that “over-en-
gineering” is avoided and keeps the costs of customization at bay.
Third, the development approach at StreetScooter was also char-
acterized by a desire to manage the risk of the development process at a
very early stage. As such, a strategy that is aimed at shortening de-
velopment cycles and ensuring cost-efficient customization necessarily
carries a considerable level of risk – both from a technological and an
economic perspective. To manage these risks, the development team set
out to test the prototypes of the StreetScooter as early as possible under
realistic conditions (i.e., testing the vehicle in the delivery routines of
couriers). From a technological perspective, these trials provided va-
luable feedback, thereby reducing performance risk. Moreover, this
approach also entailed that the StreetScooter was never “finalized” in
the strict sense of the word; rather, the car went (and is still going)
through continuous iterations and feedback loops, similar to the con-
tinuous deployment strategies that have proven successful in the soft-
ware industry. From an economic perspective, early and continuous
testing under realistic conditions also helped to reduce the uncertainty
regarding the marketability of the vehicle. That is, in environments of
high uncertainty, the only possible way to assess the sales potential of a
product may consist in actually testing the product in controlled
“market expeditions” that are conducted with select groups of lead
customers.
Fourth, the rapid development of the StreetScooter was also fa-
cilitated by a culture that fostered an entrepreneurial spirit and a sense
of shared ownership. Similar to the Chinese company Haier, manage-
ment at StreetScooter established a culture where trying and learning
were prioritized over validating and where failures were not considered
as defeats but as valuable opportunities for learning. While such a
“failure-friendly” culture is likely to encourage employees to move
beyond their comfort zone, StreetScooter also implemented specific
management practices that ensured that the lessons learned from these
mistakes were actually captured and diffused throughout the develop-
ment teams. Put differently, establishing a culture where employees feel
confident to try their ideas even at the risk of failing is only one side of
the coin; in addition, management needs to ensure that the learning
opportunities provided by failures are actually seized.
In sum, the four agile principles outlined above – rapid prototyping,
customer integration, risk management, and failure-friendly culture –
helped a small start-up in developing a cost-efficient electric vehicle, a
feat that the incumbents in the automotive industry had failed to
achieve. However, the case of StreetScooter does not only deserve at-
tention because it shows how agile approaches can be implemented
successfully in “hardware-heavy” industries, but also because it aligns
with many of the findings presented in this Special Issue.
For example, the analysis of Ghezzi and Cavallo (2019) suggests that
start-ups that need to cope with highly dynamic and unpredictable
environments are most likely to benefit from agility. The relationship
between characteristics of the environment on the one hand and the use
of agile development approaches on the other hand may also help to
explain the extraordinarily rapid development process at StreetScooter.
As such, the market for electric vehicles can be characterized as a highly
dynamic and relatively unpredictable one. As a point in case, the suc-
cessful diffusion of electric vehicles is not only contingent on customer
demand but also on the development of a wider power infrastructure
and advances in associated technologies such as battery technology and
renewable energies. Arguably, this environment may have benefited
smaller firms such as StreetScooter that can react more quickly to
changes in the environment or customer demands compared to larger
and more entrenched players. Put differently, the dynamism and un-
predictability associated with e-mobility may have discouraged in-
cumbents from entering the market, thus opening a window of oppor-
tunity for smaller firms that had relatively little to lose.
Furthermore, the study of Bianchi et al. (2019) indicates that while
the use of sprints may lead to more effective development processes,
early and frequent user feedback may potentially prolong time-to-
market. To account for these findings, the authors speculate that (p.13)
“extensive beta testing may result in information overload without
discerning high-priority from low-priority information (…), potentially
causing bottlenecks (…) and hence slowing down the NPD process”. At
first sight, these findings seem to contradict the experiences at
StreetScooter where continuous feedback loops were considered as one
of the key strengths of the development process. However, it is im-
portant to note that StreetScooter followed a two-pronged strategy
where the collection of continuous feedback was coupled with a strict
prioritization of user requirements. Hence, the findings of Bianchi et al.
(2019) as well as the learnings from StreetScooter suggest that while
continuous user feedback is crucial for an effective development pro-
cess, it is equally important to have a process in place that effectively
separates the “wheat from the chaff”.
Finally, Annosi et al. (2019) as well as Fecher et al. (2019) point to
the importance of organizational learning in the context of agile de-
velopment. That is, both articles note that transitioning to an innova-
tion organization requires management interventions that deeply en-
grain agile principles in an organization's day-to-day routines. Again,
the StreetScooter case study provides support for this idea. As such, one
S. Paluch, et al. Journal of Business Research 110 (2020) 495–501
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of the key tasks of the management team at StreetScooter was to ensure
that the insights gained in the development process were not isolated
instances of learning but were continuously diffused throughout the
entire organization.
6. Managerial lessons learned
Drawing on the insights from the papers presented in this Special
Issue, the StreetScooter case and our additional theorizing, we propose
a number of principles that appear to be redefining the innovation
process as we know it. Table 2 is helpful in this regard, as it summarizes
the central boundary conditions that help to facilitate managers' deci-
sion for a stage-gate or an agile development approach.
(1) Find the appropriate innovation approach for a given context
Agile innovation is not the panacea for all organizational challenges
when managing innovation. Alas, managers need to carefully analyze
the environment and the strategic objectives of their company before
deciding for an innovation approach. Stage-gate or hybrid approaches
aim at reducing uncertainty at the beginning of the innovation process.
Accordingly, when targeting continuous improvements, these ap-
proaches are a simple and efficient approach. Agile innovation, in
contrast, is more suitable for dynamic environments when the solution
is expected to be more unique, should result in a more radical in-
novation, but also is subject to large uncertainties both with regard to
the market and the technological base (e.g. the StreetScooter) (Bianchi
et al., 2019).
Another contingency informing the choice of agile versus determi-
nistic innovation models (like stage-gate) is the preferred level of
control by management (Mills et al., 2019). We believe that in practice
the decision for or against agile or stage-gate approaches crucially de-
pends on the desire for control during different phases of the innovation
process. Organizations (managers) in favor of control will demand a
stage-gate model which provides pre-defined objectives and continuous
stages of report and review. On the other side, managers who can live
with (or even embrace) a moderate level of control will call for hybrid
models. Hence, managers calling for agile innovation really have to
understand what this means: to break with the common dominant
paradigm of planning and control!
(2) Become customer-centric – integrate the customer early
Put the customer in the front and center. What may sound simple
has many companies struggling, especially when it boils down to
understanding customer needs. Agile approaches strive for addressing
customer requirements continuously. Regular input and feedback in
different stages of the innovation process is a necessity. Integrating
customers in early testing activities helps to uncover hitherto unused
potential. Dziallas (2019) emphasize the important strategic role of
customer integration in the front-end of product development. It is a
crucial juncture for innovation managers to decide whether to follow up
on or reject an idea. Relatedly, communication with the customer
(Dziallas, 2019) is another central but often overlooked aspect. As a
consequence, companies often develop products that do not meet cus-
tomer requirements or that exceed their needs (over-engineering), as a
result of too little communication. StreetScooter integrated feedback
and suggestions from DHL's couriers very early in the development
process. Couriers could test the primotype, experience the innovation
first-hand, and gradually help to adjust the vehicle to meet their specific
needs. Quintessentially, innovation managers need to identify key
customers and carefully select suitable participants for ideation work-
shops, test runs, and feedback sessions. In accomplishing this, they
should communicate the additional value that participants receive
when jointly creating innovations: higher product satisfaction with the
final product and lower acceptance barriers. Along these lines, many
companies are starting to create innovation labs – organizational spaces
where creativity is stimulated to facilitate new ideas and innovations
(Magadley & Birdi, 2009). These labs represent a new form of customer
integration: a method to incorporate customers and other stakeholders
in an agile innovation process (Fecher et al., 2019).
(3) Implement a failure culture – learning from mistakes
People often strive for perfection, yet it is practice that makes per-
fect. In fact, an agile paradigm is about making mistakes and learning
from them. “Fail fast, and fail often!”, a frequently quoted mantra from
Silicon Valley, reflects the agile innovation approach vividly. Albeit,
managers and the thinking around them need to get acquainted with
this new way of innovating. Managers mandating agile innovation have
to recognize that they also have a mandate to fail (in a project by one of
the authors with a large financial institution even a “minimum failure
rate” was established to foster more radical innovating (and hence risky
thinking)). How fast companies can learn from their mistakes depends
on many factors, including their size, company structure, or environ-
ment (Ghezzi & Cavallo, 2019). Admittedly, it will be particularly
challenging for larger established companies with well-proven struc-
tures to overcome old habits and develop the open culture required to
make agile innovation work. Rather than judging people when mistakes
occur, firms should focus on motivating employees to see mistakes as an
Table 2
Selected boundary conditions of stage-gate and agile development.
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opportunity to learn and to grow, individually and collectively. Annosi
et al. (2019) pick up on the topic of agile organizational learning and
point out that agile organizations are complex structures and managers
must first of all get familiar with the concept of organizational lea-
dership without control. Organizational learning from failure must also
be learned. The authors suggest that shared values, routines, and
carefully designed processes are the necessary foundation to further
encourage organizational learning.
7. Conclusion
Cooper's (1986) book “Winning at New Products: Accelerating the
Process from Idea to Launch” drew deeply on decades of academic work
to develop an innovation model that ever since resonated well with
researchers and managers alike. Stage-Gate has been reported to be
employed by firms extensively (Cooper, 2008; Cooper, Edgett, &
Kleinschmidt, 2002). Yet, much as the originator of the work did, one
may ask the question: What's next: after Stage-Gate?
One prominent response in this respect has been agile practices
which have already been integrated into the innovation management
practices of many organizations. More theoretical work has also started
to explore agile-hybrid forms of organizing. The articles selected for this
Special Issue paint interesting avenues for researchers, managers, and
students of innovation management alike. We are sure that a careful
reading will proliferate many of the ideas and topics studied.
As the initial reference to artists highlighted, despite the differences
in approaching the canvas, both Monet and Pollock shared a common
element inasmuch as that they worked from their own imagination to
turn mere ideas into physical reality. Yet much like the companies,
industries, and innovation strategies exemplified in this Special Issue,
both painters widely differed in how they pursued this process.
Pollock's work was virtually impossible to anticipate, but is well-re-
cognized for its innovation, creativity and beauty (Frank, 1983).
However, at times he chose to destroy elements of his art when he felt
his creations were no longer in harmony with his artistic spirit (Frank,
1983). Monet painted countless water lilies, yet he also became a per-
fectionist who was very selective about which paintings to sign and sell
and at times he even destroyed several paintings out of frustration
before exhibiting them (Levine, 1986).
Together, the research presented in this Special Issue highlights an
important delineation: What may work for one company under pre-
dictable conditions may not work under uncertainty, what may work
for individual projects becomes problematic for organizations. Our in-
troductory essay to the Special Issue also suggests that when organi-
zational exploration is embedded into the development of organiza-
tional routines, firms can create the capacity to be routinely adaptive
and innovative either employing continuous deployment or hyper-agile
structures. This offers the potential to tackle the challenges involved in
moving from project-based organizations to true innovation organiza-
tions.
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